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December 1, 2021

VIA EMAIL (Karen Kelleher — kkelleher@stow-ma.gov)

Town of Stow
Board of Appeals
380 Great Road
Stow, MA 01775-2127

RE: Appeal from Unfavorable Action
Applicant: Mark D. Forgues
Property: 84-102 Great Road
Owner: Presti Family Limited Partnership

Dear Chair and Members of the Stow Zoning Board of Appeals:

Please consider this as notice that the undersigned Attorney Robert E. McLaughlin, Sr. and Attorney John G. Hofmann represent Presti Family Limited Partnership ("Presti") in the matter listed above, which is assigned for public hearing on Monday, December 6, 2021 at 8:20 P.M.

Please also consider this a request that the hearing, in accordance with Section 6.3 of the ZBA Rules and Regulations, be continued until there is a ruling on the following procedural matters:

The Nature of the Building Commissioner's Decision

Mr. Frank Ramsbottom, Stow Building Commissioner, did not actually make a ruling on the Cease and Desist Order requested by the applicant, Mark D.

Forgues. Instead, he responded by stating: "Currently, the matter you are referring to is in litigation. It is not appropriate for me to take action on a matter until the courts have given us their direction." Mr. Forgues's justification for the appeal complains that his request for enforcement should not be delayed pending the outcome of litigation from a different abutter. Respectfully, that is the matter before this Zoning Board of Appeals at this hearing. The matter is not ripe for a determination of the requested Cease and Desist Order, because a ruling on that specific matter has not been made by the Building Commissioner. The authority of the Zoning Board of Appeals is to act upon the appeal by Mr. Forgues on the decision that the Building Commissioner did make. The Board can either uphold the decision of the Building Commissioner or, by a vote of at least 4 in the affirmative and 1 in the negative, remand the matter with direction as to how to act upon the requested Cease and Desist Order.

Substantive Deficiencies in the Appeal Filed by Mark Forgues

The thrust of Mr. Forgues's request for a Cease and Desist Order is two-fold. First, he claims that there is an increase or change in use of the locus because an additional third Class II auto dealership license has been issued and, by reason thereof, this is a change of use and increase in use of the property.

Secondly, Mr. Forgues claims that there has been a discontinuance or abandonment of the previous nonconforming use of the property for more than two years and that it cannot be reestablished except upon a special permit.

With regard to the first issue, Mr. Forgues has not provided any actual evidence of an increase or change in use, as required under controlling law. The addition of one or more Class II licenses, in and of itself, does not come close to meeting the familiar three-part test established by Bridgewater v. Chuckran, 351 Mass. 20 (1966). See also Powers v. Building Inspector of Barnstable, 363 Mass. 648 (1973). The relevant inquiries are: (i) whether the current use reflects the nature and purpose of the prior use; (ii) whether there is a difference in quality or character, as well as the degree, of use, and (iii) whether the current use is different in kind in its effect on the neighborhood. In addition, a certain amount of growth or increase of a use is allowed. See Board of Selectmen of Blackstone v. Clayton Tellestone, 4 Mass. App. Ct. 311 (1976) ("the character of a use does not change solely by reason of an increase in its volume"). And Mr. Forgues needs to show a

"substantial" extension or increase in the use at issue to justify zoning enforcement by the Building Commissioner. Oakham Sand & Gravel Corp. v. Town of Oakham, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 80 (2002). He has not done so. The mere fact of the issuance of an additional license does not necessarily prove an actual increase or change in use, let alone a "substantial" one. For example, there may be a grandfathered, automotive use and sales of 100 cars protected as a nonconforming use under one automotive dealership license. The mere fact that, thereafter, there are three automotive sales licenses issued for use on the same property, and each one only sells 10 cars per year, there would not be an increase in use that needs a special permit. Thus, if and when this exact issue is before this Board, his appeal should be denied forthwith.

Second, the issue of the discontinuance or abandonment of a previous nonconforming use claimed by Mr. Forgues to have occurred between 2008 and 2012, has previously been examined and determined by this Board. In the decision of Kathleen Fisher v. Presti Family Limited Partnership, dated December 20, 2017, (a copy of which is attached to this letter for the convenience of the Zoning Board), this Board decided there was no abandonment of the auto-related uses.

In paragraph 3 of the Findings and Fact of that decision, this Board determined that uses including "automotive and other vehicle (boat) sales and service; related retail; outside storage and display" were lawful, preexisting, nonconforming uses. The decision continued in paragraph 4 as follows:

> 4. The above uses continued through a change in ownership of locus from the Erkinnen family to Presti in 2004. Since 2004, documented use of locus has included used car sales; car repairs, boat sales and service; towing; auto body shop; bus storage; contractor, landscaping and tree business, including outside storage of materials and equipment; hobby shop; car wrapping; container storage; tile sales; a school [Stepping Stones School, closed in 2015]; and residential use (the dwelling on the rear parcel). [Presti grids]. Tenants have changed over the years, but *uses* continuing without interruption consist of automotive and other vehicle (boat) sales and service; related retail; and outside storage and display.

Thus, this Board concluded, as to the issue of abandonment:

> 5. There has been no abandonment of the automobile sales use, notwithstanding the waxing and waning of automobile sales since 2004. Although not dispositive on its own, licenses to conduct vehicle sales (Class II) have been issued by the Town continuously during this time, to the present day, to a number of business operating on locus. Neither the intent to abandon the automobile sales use, nor voluntary conduct carrying the implication of abandonment was demonstrated. See Town of Orange v. Shay, 68 Mass.App.Ct. 358, 363 (2007).

Accordingly, if and when this issue reaches this Board, and if the appeal is not dismissed outright for failing to provide any evidence of an actual increase or change in use, then this Board should adopt the findings and conclusions of its own prior decision on the issue of the alleged abandonment of the auto-related uses on the property.

In conclusion, the real issue before the Board is whether the Building Commissioner's decision to defer any decision on the substance of the appeal was correct. If the Board agrees and votes in favor, then the present appeal, as such, should be denied. If the Board disagrees, the issue should be remanded to the Building Commissioner in order for him to make an actual decision on the substance of the appeal (i.e., whether an additional Class II dealer license at the property, without more, constitutes a "substantial" change or increase in use?). Depending on the result of that decision, further proceedings may be necessary.

Thank you for your attention and consideration of this matter.

Very truly yours,

/s/ Robert E. McLaughlin,Sr.
Robert E. McLaughlin, Sr.

Attachment

TOWN OF STOW

ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS

NOTICE OF DECISION



Applicant: Kathleen Fisher, 1 White Pond Road

Relief Requested: Reversal of Building Inspector's denial of requests to enforce the Zoning Bylaw dated June 30, 2017 and August 7, 2017 with respect to locus.

Locus: 84-92 Great Road
Assessor's Map R-29, Parcels 85A and 83
Owner: Presti Family Limited Partnership[1]

Sitting: Edmund C. Tarnuzzer, Jr., Chairman, Charles Barney, William Byron, Bruce Fletcher, Mark Jones

Decision of the Board:

Pursuant to G.L. c. 40A, ss. 8 and 15 and Section 9.1 of the Zoning Bylaw, and following public hearing, the Zoning Board of Appeals voted 5-0 to *affirm in part* and *reverse in part* the Building Inspector's Decisions.

Record

(Fisher) Application for Hearing received July 31, 2017, with exhibits
Presti Packet dated August 12, 2017, with exhibits
(Fisher) Application for Hearing received September 1, 2017, with exhibits
Katie Fisher Enforcement Appeal, Supplemental Materials
(Presti) Memorandum in Opposition to Appeal of Building Commissioner's Denial of Zoning Enforcement, with exhibits, dated October 2, 2017
Correspondence dated October 2, 2017 from Craig Martin, Building Inspector
(Presti) Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Appeal of Building Commissioner's Denial of Zoning Enforcement, with exhibits, dated October 19, 2017 (original and revised)
Memorandum of Stow Planning Department dated October 19, 2017
Correspondence dated October 19, 2017 from Mark Forgues, with exhibits
(Fisher) Letter of Christopher Alphen, Esq. dated November 9, 2017

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[1] The Assessor's property record cards states the parcels' owner to be "Presti Family Limited Partnership Presti Management Corporation." According to records of the Secretary of State, the Presti Management Corporation is the sole general partner of the Presti Family Limited Partnership.

Memorandum of Stow Planning Department and Building Department dated November 9, 2017
Presti Packet dated November 9, 2017, with exhibits

Facts and Procedural History

Locus consists of two adjoining parcels identified as 84 and 92 Great Road. 84 Great Road has no frontage on Great Road and is accessed over 92 Great Road. Both parcels are located in a Business District. A residence and one additional structure (barn) are located on 84 Great Road, the "rear parcel." A third structure is located on 92 Great Road near its frontage, occupied by a number of businesses leasing space from property owner Presti. Portions of the locus are used by these and other businesses for exterior storage. Ms. Katie Fisher owns and resides at property locate at 1 White Pond Road, which abuts the 92 Great Road parcel near the main structure.

In letters dated April 7, 2017, and May 22, 2017, Ms. Fisher requested that the Building Inspector issue cease and desist orders to stop commercial traffic on locus. By letter dated May 26, 2017, the Building Inspector advised that his inspection of the property had determined that Mr. Presti's tenants were using the site for "storing materials which consist of trucks, cars, snow-plowing equipment, trailers, building and construction materials, piles of cord wood, wood chippers, clean dumpsters and school buses." The Building Inspector further advised that these uses were "grandfathered," i.e., lawful pre-existing nonconforming uses, and that as zoning enforcement officer he had no control over traffic.

In a letter dated June 8, 2017, Ms. Fisher requested from the Building Inspector information on any permits issued for construction and excavation activities occurring on the Presti property. In a letter dated June 30, 2017, the Building Inspector advised that no permits had issued for construction on locus, but that he would inspect the premises to determine if a permit were required. He further advised that the amount of soil removed from locus was below the threshold set by the Earth Removal Bylaw triggering a permit requirement. He further advised that he would meet with Mr. Presti regarding other issues raised by Ms Fisher.

In a letter dated July 24, 2017, counsel for Ms. Fisher requested further information from the Building Inspector, and alleged a number of zoning and other violations on locus. By letter dated August 7, 2017, the Building Inspector responded, finding 1) the challenged uses to be lawful, pre-existing nonconforming uses, requiring no special permits; 2) no zoning violation with respect to site lighting, vehicle parking, landscaped buffers, or traffic. The Building Inspector further advised that certain environmental and other concerns raised by Ms. Fisher should be addressed to other Town departments.

Ms. Fisher timely appealed the Building Inspector's June 30, 2017 and August 7, 2017 enforcement denials to the Board. Both appeals claim that certain uses on the property are not permitted under the Zoning Bylaw; are not protected as pre-existing nonconforming uses; and require a special permit. Several Zoning Bylaw violations, are also alleged, including violations of Bylaw provisions relating to lighting, landscaping, and parking.

Public hearing on the first appeal opened on September 11, 2017 and immediately continued without testimony to October 2 2017, when public hearing on the second appeal opened.[2] The two appeals were heard together on that date; continued to October 19, 2017 and November 9, 2017, when public hearing closed. On November 16, 2017, the Board voted unanimously to uphold the Building Inspector in part and reverse in part, as discussed further below.

Prior Determinations

A decision of the Board dated January 19, 2001, addressing the storage and display of boats on locus for sales and repairs, found that locus had been used for auto sales and service since 1936; that "similar continuous uses of the property and building have been made since 1936, up to and including the current tenant, Bay State Boat Works"; that "[s]ince the garage was first opened in 1936, a portion of the building occupied by the boat sales and repair shop has continually been used for the sale to the public of automobiles, tires, and now boats"; and that "[e]ach of these sales operations has continually made effective use of outside displays and storage of the goods for sale." The decision concluded that the outside display and storage of boats was a lawful preexisting nonconforming use and that no zoning violation had occurred.

On June 14, 2010, Mr. Presti requested a determination as to whether special permits were needed for certain tenants "currently renting space and storing items outside" on locus. On July 13, 2010, the Building Inspector advised that no special permits were needed as storage of vehicles, equipment and materials "are the same or consistent with the past uses of the site recognized as grandfathered uses. . . ." See July 13, 2010 letter from Building Inspector to Mr. Presti.

Findings of Fact

The Board makes the following findings of fact based on the record evidence, including the written submissions and testimony of Ms. Fisher, Mr. Presti, the Town Planning and Building Departments, and members of the public:

1. Information regarding use of locus dates to 1936, when the Erkinnen family purchased the property. No zoning bylaw then existed in Stow. At that time a restaurant and gas station operated on locus.

2. Uses on the property grew to include a Buick dealership, new and used car sales, repairs, and a body shop. Other uses on the property by tenants over the years consisted of retail, storage and display of vehicles and materials, including a tire company, boat sales and service, body shop, and storage of vehicles and equipment by landscapers and contractors.

3. The above uses - automotive and other vehicle (boat) sales and service; related retail; outside storage and display - were ongoing in 1968, when the Town adopted a Zoning Bylaw, , placing the westerly portion of the front of locus in a Business District and the easterly and rear

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[2] By agreement, the time for filing a decision in both appeals was extended to December 22, 2017.

portions in a Residential District.. To the extent any of the above uses were not permitted in the Business or Residential Districts, or allowed only by special permit, such uses were lawful, preexisting nonconforming uses. In 2004, the portion of locus zoned Residential was rezoned Business.

4. The above uses continued through a change in ownership of locus from the Erkinnen family to Presti in 2004. Since 2004, documented use of locus has included used car sales; car repairs, boat sales and service; towing; auto body shop; bus storage; contractor, landscaping and tree businesses, including outside storage of materials and equipment; hobby shop; car wrapping; container storage; tile sales; a school[3]; and residential use (the dwelling on the rear parcel). [*Presti grids]*. *Tenants* have changed over the years, but *uses* continuing without interruption consist of automotive and other vehicle (boat) sales and service; related retail; and outside storage and display.

5. There has been no abandonment of the automobile sales use, notwithstanding the waxing and waning of automobile sales since 2004. Although not dispositive on its own, licenses to conduct vehicle sales (Class II) have been issued by the Town continuously during this time, to the present day, to a number of businesses operating on locus. Neither the intent to abandon the automobile sales use, nor voluntary conduct carrying the implication of abandonment was demonstrated. See Town of Orange v. Shay, 68 Mass.App.Ct. 358, 363 (2007)

6. Current uses on the property include: used automobile sales and service; automobile leasing; towing; car wrapping; bus company storage; landscaping business and storage; contractor business and storage; tree business and storage; container storage; and residential.

7. All of the above uses, except residential use, include outside storage. The automobile sales use includes outside display.

8. The three structures on locus predate the adoption of zoning in 1968.

9. Exterior lighting fixtures on locus are not "full cutoff." Cut sheets from Hudson Light and Power do not provide a lumen count, but the lighting fixtures are 128 Watts and the cut sheets indicate that they are not full cutoff.

10. Although occurrences of odor and dust emanating from locus were reported by Ms. Fisher, which reports the Board does not discount, there are currently no such emanations from the property.

Applicable Law and Discussion[4]

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[3] Stepping Stones School, closed in 2015.

[4] Section 3.9.6 of the Stow Zoning Bylaw governs changes to nonconforming uses and structures. Certain criteria contained in Section 3.9.6.1 and Section 3.9.6.2 are applicable *if it is determined, through application of the Powers test*, that the proposed use is a "change or substantial extension" of the existing nonconforming use.

General Laws c. 40A, s. 6 "provides that a nonconforming use of land, if lawfully created, is exempt from subsequently enacted zoning provisions." Oakham Sand and Gravel Corp. v. Town of Oakham, 54 Mass.App.Ct. 80 (2002). To preserve the protection afforded a preexisting, nonconforming use under G.L. c. 40A, s. 6, any subsequent use of the property must not constitute a "change or substantial extension" of the protected nonconforming use. Id., citing Ka-Hur Enterprises, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Provincetown, 40 Mass.App.Ct. 71, 74 (1996). If any subsequent use *does* constitute a "change or substantial extension" of the nonconforming use, a special permit is required under G.L. c. 40A, s. 6, granted only if the changed use is determined to be not substantially more detrimental to the neighborhood than the existing nonconforming use. See G.L. c. 40A, s. 6; Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Jacob, 2015 WL 5824402 at p. 10 (Land Court, Oct. 6, 2015 (Long, J.), citing Barron Chevrolet, Inc. v Town of Danvers, 419 Mass. 404, 410 (1995).

Not *all* changes to a preexisting nonconforming use trigger the requirement of a special permit. A three-pronged test is applied to the facts of each case to determine whether such requirement is triggered (the "Powers" or "Chuckran" test[5]): (1) Whether the proposed use reflects the nature and purpose of the prior use, (2) Whether there is a difference in the quality or character, as well as the degree, of use, and (3) Whether the current use is 'different in kind in its effect on the neighborhood. Derby Refining Co. v. City of Chelsea, 407 Mass. 703, 712 (1990); Almeida v. Arruda, 89 Mass. App. Ct. at 243. If the use in question is consistent with all three Powers considerations - in other words, if the answers are yes, no, and no, respectively - the use is protected under G.L. c. 40A, s. 6 without further inquiry. See Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Jacob, supra at p. 10, citing Barron Chevrolet, Inc. v. Town of Danvers, 419 Mass. at 413. If the Powers test is failed, a special permit is required. Id.

The Board has reviewed the existing uses on locus and has first considered whether these uses are permitted in the Business District under Section 3.3 of the Zoning Bylaw. For those uses that are not permitted in the Business District (for example, outside storage), the Board has considered whether these uses are lawfully nonconforming; that is, whether the uses were in existence in 1968 when the Zoning Bylaw was adopted, rendering them nonconforming. The Board has applied the Powers test to determine whether each of the current uses is a "change or substantial extension" of the lawful, preexisting nonconforming uses. The Board has also examined the evidence to determine whether any of the preexisting nonconforming uses have been abandoned as that term is used in the Zoning Bylaw. [6]

Based on the above examinations, the Board concludes that *automobile sales* are permitted under Section 3.3.2.3; to the extent the *outside display and storage of automobiles* are not allowed under that section of the Bylaw, such outside display and storage of automobiles were lawfully in

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[5] Powers v. Building Inspector of Barnstable, 363 Mass. 348 (1973); Bridgewater v. Chuckran, 351 Mass. 20 (1966).

[6] Section 3.9.3 of the Zoning Bylaw provides that "if the nonconforming use is discontinued or abandoned for a period of two or more years, it shall not be reestablished except upon a special permit granted by the Board of Appeals."

existence in 1968 and for decades prior. The Board finds no abandonment of the automobile sales use, where neither an intent to abandon the use nor voluntary conduct carrying the implication of abandonment was demonstrated. Applying the Powers test to the current automobile sales use, including outside display and storage, the Board finds that the current outside display and storage *of automobiles* is not a "change or substantial extension" of the preexisting nonconforming use. However, the Board finds that the outside display or storage of vehicles *other than automobiles* is a change or substantial extension of the preexisting nonconforming use, as this is an increase in intensity and has greater impacts on the neighborhood. The storage of trucks and buses might be said to reflect the "nature and purpose" of the original nonconforming use, storage of automobiles. However, trucks and buses have a different character and visual impact on the neighborhood; further, the entry and exit of trucks and buses for storage or display on locus generates more noise than cars entering and exiting the property, producing a greater impact on the neighborhood. Under G.L. c. 40A, s. 6, a special permit is required for the outside display or storage of vehicles other than automobiles.

The Board further concludes that certain *automobile service* use is permitted under Section 3.3.3.3, subject to certain limitations and requirements. The Board finds that to the extent *automobile service* use on the property exceeds the limitations of this Bylaw section, such automobile services were lawfully in existence in 1968 and for decades prior. Applying the Powers test to the current automobile service use, the Board finds that the current use is not a "change or substantial extension" of the preexisting nonconforming use. The current automobile service use has not enlarged or expanded the area of locus occupied, and has not increased the noise level or visual impact of this use.

The Board further concludes that the *automobile leasing and towing* uses are allowed at least in part under Section 3.3.2.1 and 3.3.2.2, which permit "service establishments" and "business or professional offices." To the extent these uses include activity outside the building, they do not conform to the Bylaw, but they are consistent with the automobile-related services that have been located on the property since the 1930s. Applying the Powers test to the *automobile leasing and towing uses*, the Board finds that the current use is not a "change or substantial extension" of the preexisting nonconforming use. The leasing and towing uses of the property do not occupy a greater portion of locus, nor do they increase the noise level or visual impact on the neighborhood, from the prior nonconforming automobile-related services

The Board further concludes that the *car wrapping* use is permitted as a "service establishment" under Section 3.3.2.1 or as a "business or professional use" under Section 3.3.2.2. This business has no manufacturing element. It provides to customers computer-aided design and printing, followed by application of the printed product to their vehicles. To the extent the car wrapping use includes activity outside the building, it does not conform to Section 3.3.2.1, but the use is wholly consistent with the automobile-related services that have been located on the property since prior to 1968. Applying the Powers test to the *car wrapping use*, the Board finds that the current use is not a "change or substantial extension" of the preexisting nonconforming use. Application of the printed product to vehicle exteriors creates no greater noise, visual impact, or vibration than other automobile services previously provided on locus.

The Board further concludes that the *contractor, landscaper and tree businesses*, with *associated storage of equipment, including containers*, are not permitted uses under Bylaw Section 3.3. The Board finds that certain storage of equipment by businesses is a lawfully nonconforming use, having been in existence prior to the 1968 Zoning Bylaw adoption. The Board further finds, however, that the storage of equipment, including containers, has changed and expanded since that time. Applying the Powers test to the *contractor, landscaper, and tree businesses, including associated storage of equipment*, the Board finds that the current use is a "change or substantial extension" of the preexisting nonconforming use. The current storage by multiple tenants of a variety of equipment does not reflect the "nature and purpose" of the storage use in 1968, which centered on automobiles. Further, there is a difference in the quality, character, and degree of storage use since that time. The area of locus used for storage has expanded since 1968, and that for this purpose, portions of the property have been cleared and the topography altered. The types of containers stored on the property have grown to include clean dumpsters, which generate noise when being moved on and off the property. As a result of these changes to the appearance and noise generated on the property, the current storage use has an effect "different in kind" on the neighborhood than the prior storage use. A special permit is required for the businesses and associated storage of equipment

The Board further concludes that to the extent the main structure on locus containing the above uses does not conform to the dimensional requirements of Bylaw Section 3.3.1, such requirements are inapplicable to the structures and uses contained within. All buildings on locus are lawfully nonconforming, having been constructed prior to 1968.

Section 7.7.4.1 of the Bylaw requires a landscaped buffer to screen parking and loading areas on property adjacent to a Residential district. The appellant argues that this requirement applies to locus and that zoning violation exists where no such landscaped buffer screens locus from her property. Parking, loading and storage uses have occurred on locus since well prior to the 1968 adoption of the Zoning Bylaw. Under G.L. c. 40A, s. 6, "a nonconforming use of land, if lawfully created, is exempt from subsequently enacted zoning provisions." Oakham Sand and Gravel Corp. v. Town of Oakham, 54 Mass.App.Ct. 80 (2002). We have found that these uses to be lawfully preexisting on locus, and accordingly that the requirements of Section 7.7.4.1, enacted no earlier than 1968, do not apply. Accordingly, we find no violation of this Section.

The Board finds sufficient evidence that the lighting fixtures on locus do not conform to Zoning Bylaw. Sections 3.8.1.5 prohibits exterior lighting from shining on adjacent properties or towards any street in such a manner as to create a nuisance or hazard; Section 3.8.1.5. 6 requires that all exterior lighting fixtures with an output in excess of 2000 lumens is required to be "full cutoff." The exterior lighting fixtures on locus are not "full cutoff." Cut sheets from Hudson Light and Power do not provide a lumen count, but the lighting fixtures are 128 Watts and the cut sheets indicate that they are not full cutoff. The lighting fixtures must be adjusted so as to comply with Section 3.8.1.5, including subsections (1)-(6), of the Zoning Bylaw.

The Board finds no evidence of any other violations of the Zoning Bylaw on locus.

Conclusion

Based on the record and for the reasons above, the Board upholds in part and reverses in part the Building Inspector's two denials of Ms. Fisher's zoning enforcement requests. Special Permits are required for the uses identified above *only*; the other uses discussed are lawfully nonconforming and/or do not constitute a "change or substantial expansion" of such preexisting nonconforming uses. For a period of sixty days, no cease and desist order shall issue with respect to the uses identified above as requiring a special permit. After such sixty-day period, if no application for a special permit has been filed with the Board, such cease and desist order may issue.

Lighting on locus shall be modified in accordance with the Zoning Bylaw.

SIGNATURE PAGE FOLLOWS

Appeals of this decision may be made pursuant to Section 17 of Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 40A and shall be filed within twenty (20) days after the date this decision is filed with the Stow Town Clerk.

STOW ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS

December 20, 2017
Received and filed
Volume III, Page 750 and 762

Town Clerk of Stow

A TRUE COPY,
ATTEST,
TOWN CLERK STOW, MA